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RECENT DEVELOPMENT AND TENDENCY OF THE
LAW OF PRIZE.
The status of modem prize law is expressed in outline in the
four propositions of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, by which
privateering was abolished; enemy goods under a neutral flag, and
neutral goods under an enemy flag, were protected, with the excep-
tion of contraband of war; and blockades were required to be effec-
tive in order to be binding. The United States had previously pro-
posed to the maritime nations, as permanent principles of inter-
national law, the declaration respecting enemy and neutral goods;
and coupled its declination to accede to the Declaration of Paris
in its entirety, with an offer to assent to the first proposition abolish-
ing privateering if amended by a declaration that the private prop-
erty of individuals, though belonging to belligerent states, should
be altogether exempt from capture in maritime war. This en-
lightened doctrine marks the furthest advance in the field, and, as
our diplomatic history shows, has been the consistent attitude and
proposal of the United States.
A comparative view of the situation a century earlier is given
by an opinion in which the high officers of justice in England con-
curred, including the Solicitor General, afterwards Lord Mansfield.
They announced the fundamental rule that powers at war have
the right to make prize of the ships and goods of each other upon the
high seas; that enemy goods on board a friend's ship may be taken,
and that the lawful goods of a friend, on board an enemy's ship,
ought to be restored, unless contraband. This opinion or report was
approved in 1794 by Sir Win. Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, in a
letter to Mr. Jay, which in itself and as the basis of Justice Story's
treatise on prize law forms a classic in the learning on the subject. "
In the century between Lord Mansfield's opinion and the Dec-
laration of Paris, and especially through the retaliations of English
Notes on the Principles and Practice of Prize Courts, "by the late
Judge Story," London, 1854; 1 Wheat., p. 494, n. 2; 2 Wheat., Appendix, note 1.
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order and French decree in the Napoleonic wars, there was keen
debate in diplomacy and law respecting "free goods" in enemy or
neutral bottoms, and regarding the essentials of valid blockade. The
liberal and progressive view has now been established as against
the rigor of belligerent rights; "paper blockades" have definitely
lost efficacy, and the neutral flag covers enemy goods.
Looking back from the point reached in 1756-the course of
development has proceeded by slow degrees from days of unrelieved
pillage by land and sea. Rights of persons and property were
little regarded in fact even after the religion and morals of Chris-
tianity had for centuries theoretically affected government and
law. It requires slight reading in chroniclers comparatively recent,
like Froissart, to perceive how defenceless the people were from the
aggressions of every contending force, regular and irregular, friend
and foe, in the innumerable wars and petty conflicts which kept
Europe in turmoil for centuries. Whatever the forms and theories
of jurisprudence and administration were, in practice they were inef-
fective. Rights which are now regarded as elementary, for in-
stance, the ordinary protections to neutral property and commerce,
the privileges of peaceful inhabitants of belligererit territory, were
disregarded. While great and petty dynasties were clashing, in the
final analysis it was prince and noble, the ruling classes, against the
people. When the democratic resistance slowly emerged from these
intolerable conditions and began to take on form and organization,
as in the Flemish campaigns of the 14th century, principles and
remedies gradually became efficacious.
The "free companies" were typical of the evil situation. Loosely
attached as mercenaries, they were dangerous to the states employ-
ing them and consumed the resources of any territory where they
happened to be, living by booty and indiscriminate plunder. Self-
protection, convenience and policy, by a tacit convention among
all rulers, drove them out of existence, and the doctrine and prac-
tice of taking booty, that is, private property on land seized and
treated as prize, were gradually abolished. Thus, a standing abuse,
against which the interests of private property and enlightened ideas
had for ages protested, disappeared from international law. Yet
something very like booty or ransom was taken by the English in
the composition for ships in the harbor, demanded and received at
the capture of Genoa and her dependencies in the Napoleonic wars; '
and it may still be said that in the abstract sense governments have
1 Ships taken at Genoa, 4 C. Rob. 388.
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the right of taking booty, although in practice the right is entirely
obsolete.' In the Manila prize case, awaiting decision by the
Supreme Court, the captors are claiming, as prize, property cap-




During the middle ages the historic codes appeared, like the
Consolato del Mare, drawn from the civil law and recording the
faint beginnings of system. The rules regulating capture on the
seas thus were traced as part of the primitive scheme of general
maritime law and admiralty jurisprudence. Many royal ordinances
on specific points contributed from time to time to the subject, and
reduced the scattered elements to orderly and comprehensive ar-
rangement, of which the French codification known as the Marine
Ordinance of Louis XIV furnishes an example. In England the
evolution was characteristically legislative and judicial, rather than
executive, and acts of Parliament and decisions of the courts estab-
lished the jurisdiction and the substantive law in admiralty and prize.
Throughout the process, from the days of the school-men and
learned dbctors, the speculative writers on public law, emphasizing
the ethical side, disseminated humane ideas and stimulated govern-
mental responsibility and the public conscience.
The entire development is sufficiently indicated by the notes and
citations in Justice Story's treatise.
The great admiralty judges of England, from 1750 to 1820,
and Lord Stowell in particular, created a remarkable body of law,
exploring, applying and establishing the principles of prize for the
Anglo-Saxon world, and developing the subject with admirable
elasticity and sound judgment. The leaning was to a strict view of
belligerent rights, but the exigencies of war were vindicated by
convincing logic and with justice and moderation. It is not neces-
sary to say that Lord Stowell was a remarkable man and a very
I Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch, i io; i Kent, Com., 59.
2 29 Wash. Law Rep., 437.
3 The property consisted of naval stores and supplies in the Cavite arsenal.
Since this paper was written, the Supreme Court has decided that case and
allowed the claim for this property as prize on the ground that it was "naval
stores at a naval station, taken by a naval force as the result of a naval
engagement"
"In our opinion it would be spinning altogether too nicely to hold that
because enemy property on land cannot be taken in prize by land operations,
public property designed for hostile uses, and stored on the seashore in an
establishment for facilitating naval warfare, might not be made prize, under
the statute, when captured by naval forces operating directly from the sea."
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great judge. The classic British admiralty reports (Robinson, Ed-
wards, Dodson) display the learning, acumen and industry which
called to their aid personal character and judicial temperament of the
highest order, along with remarkable power of logical analysis
and the gift of luminous statement. Although the principles of
prize constitute a special and restricted branch of jurisprudence,
touching both international law and admiralty, the student will be
amply repaia in profit and scholarly satisfaction for the time given
to the opinions which Lord Stowell delivered-for the most part
when he was Sir Win. Scott. The law of marine contra'ts in all its
branches, as to charter engagements, insurance, liens, etc., and the
general international rules of trade by sea, have all been wisely
expounded and clearly illuminated by him in connection with his
judgments on prize.
The cases in our Supreme Court growing out of the war of 1812
and the movement for independence in South America, show on the
one hand the influence of the rigorous British decisions, and on the
other the national instinct for freedom and justice toward bona fide
neutral trade. Our own interest in the maintenance of the necessary
rigors of belligerency united with the natural impulse to recognize
belligerent rights in peoples who were in formidable and justifiable
revolt; at the same time, where lawful neutral trade was con cerned,
both when we were and when we were not belligerents ourselves,
the scales were held even.
In the Civil War the United States adopted pro hac vice the
principles of the Declaration of Paris, excepting the article relating
to privateering. But as matter of fact letters of marque were not
issued. In the Spanish War our explicit assent by executive pro-
clamation covered the entire Declaration. It is recited to be "de-
sirable that the war should be conducted upon principles in harmony
with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent
practice ;" and it was announced "that the policy of the Government
will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of
the Declaration of Paris." Then follow the declarations respecting
neutral flag, neutral goods, and blockade, with special exemptions
in favor of enemy merchantmen in ports of the United States at the
beginning of the war and clearing within thirty days, or on the
high seas at said date bound for the United States. It was provided
that the right of search should be exercised with strict regard for
neutral rights, and that mail steamers should not be interfered
with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of illegality respect-
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ing contraband or blockade. I These concessions to Spanish mer-
chant vessels followed the liberal English practice under Orders in
Council relating to the Crimean War. The blockade proclamations I
allowed neutral vessels lying in any of the blockaded ports thirty
days to issue therefrom.
The striking cases of the Civil War' illustrate the just effects up-
on national jurisprudence as well as policy of the inevitable exigencies
of war. The gist of those decisions was that while it is lawful for
neutrals to trade to neutral territory, or even to enemy territory if
without violation of blockade or the rules as to contraband, yet a pre-
tended destination to a neutral port, coupled with the intent to break
blockade or carry articles ultimately destined for the enemy and obvi-
ously for warlike or contraband use, even if innocent and commercial
in themselves, cannot serve as protection. The effect of these decisions
was to restrict neutral trade and to enlarge the import of contra-
band where bona fides was justly challenged. The protest from
England marked her shift from the belligerent of the Napoleonic
wars to the carrying neutral of the later day; and the United
States presented, perhaps, a similar change of front. But when all
the facts are marshalled and the judicial logic studied, neither the
executive attitude nor the court's decisions can be successfully ques-
tioned. So long as war exists, the justice and reasoning of those
opinions will stand in international law as well as in our own mu-
nicipal law.
It seems that the attitude of England has again changed. In
the South African war the British prize court condemned goods
not contraband, including food stuffs, consigned by neutrals, citizens
of the United States, to a neutral port in Portuguese territory, where
the ultimate destination to the enemy country was matter of in-
ference rather than proof. There was no indication that any of
these goods were intended for enemy forces. Nevertheless such
property, constituting a portion of the cargoes, was condemned on
the ground of illicit trading and because, while certain neutral own-
ers who had been previously domiciled in the Transvaal were not
themselves enemies, nevertheless the destination of their goods to the
enemy's country impressed them with a hostile character. The
vessel was British, and was seized on the ground of illegal trade
1 30 Stat., 1770.
2 30 Stat., 1769, 1776.
3 The Bermuda, 3 Wall., 514; The Springbok, 5 Wall., r; The Peter-
hoff, id., 28.
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with the enemy without a license, under the rule both of the
municipal law of England and of international law. Ultimately
the vessel was restored, notwithstanding the strict rule, because of
certain equitable elements founded on the conduct and bonla fides of
her owners or charterers.'
The general effect of the South African cases is to emphasize
again the historic British position in favor of the rights of
belligerents.
This review brings us to the decisions of the Supreme Court in
cases arising out of the Spanish-American War.
In the Olinde Rodrigues2 a strong case was presented of an
attempted breach of blockade at San Juan. The lower court held
the charge made out, but restored the vessel on the ground that a
blockade maintained by a single cruiser was not effective as matter
of law. The Supreme Court exactly reversed this view. The
opinion was that the question of effectiveness is not controlled by
the number of blockading forces, but that one modem cruiser is
enough as matter of law if sufficient in fact to make ingress and
egress dangerous. On the other question the court found that,
although the case disclosed did not commend the Vessel, and there
was flagrant disregard of her duty to shun the port, and reasons
for "'strong and vehement suspicion,'" nevertheless on careful re-
view of the entire evidence, they were not compelled to proceed to
the extremity of condemning a merchant vessel belonging to citizens
of a friendly nation.
In another similar case I there was a decree of restitution where
the neutral was taken while loitering and hovering along the coast
near Havana under an accumulation of suspicious facts. The opin-
ion says:
But it may be said that the ship has too many suspicious
circumstances to account for, and that we overlook the pro-
bative strength arising from their number and their con-
currence; that if each one standing alone can be explained,
all together unerringly point to the guilt of the ship. We
appreciate the force of the argument, but cannot carry it
so far.
'The MAashona; Queen v. Bucknall Bros. et al. So far as discoverable
it is not yet reported in the books. Copies of the decision in pamphlet form
were received by the State Department in consular despatches.
2 174 U. S., 510.
3 The Newfoundland. 176 U. S., 97.
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It was held that there should be some tangible proof of the
intention to violate the blockade-"a more definite demonstration
than this record exhibits." Here again the court leaned to neutral
rights. It is probable that the facts in both cases would have
evoked the contrary leaning in the prize courts of England and
America a century ago, and resulted in condemnation.
In another case respecting neutral rights and blockade,1 where
the facts tended to show more than one secret and illicit enterprise
under assertions of innocence and convenient pretexts and evasions,
the weight of evidence and authority carried the case to the other
side and condemnation followed. The particular enterprise was
held to be unlawful as against a blockade de facto established by the
Admiral, of which the charterer and master were cognizant.
In another line of cases the scope and meaning of the Executive
proclamation (ante) were considered. In one 2 the view taken
was that an enemy vessel prosecuting a commercial voyage, without
intention to violate blockade or any other law of war, from one of
our ports to a neutral port abroad, under a coastwise clearance and
license to call at another domestic port to take on coal, falls within
the class of property which this Government has always desired to
treat with great liberality. The court say:
It is, as we think, historically accurate to say that thi.
Government has always been in its views among the most
advanced of the governments of the world in favor of miti-
gating as to all non-combatants the hardships and horrors
of war.
The fourth article of the proclamation did not clearly include a
vessel which had sailed from the United States before the com-
mencement of the war, and therefore the lower court held that since
the Buena Ventura was not in a port of the United States at the
date of commencement of the war, she did not come within the terms
of the proclamation. The Supreme Court, however, interpreting
the proclamation in the light of the liberal policy of the Government
and of the principle that where there are two or more interpretations
which possibly might be put upon the language, the one most favor-
able to the belligerent party ought to be adopted, reversed the con-
demnation and restored. This was a distinct advance toward greater
liberality from strict construction and the rigorous rules. The
court say:
1 The Adula, i76 U. S., 361.
2 The Buena Ventura, 175 U. S., 384.
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We are aware of no adjudications of our own court as
to the meaning to be given to words similar to those con-
tained in the proclamation, and it may be that a step- in ad-
vance is now taken upon this subject. Where, however,
the words are reasonably capable of an interpretation
which shall include a vessel of this description in the ex-
emption from capture, we are not averse to adopting it
even though this court may be the first to do so. If the
Executive should hereafter be inclined to take the other
view, the language of his proclamation could be so altered
as to leave no doubt of that intention, and it would be the
duty of this court to be guided and controlled by it.
In two cases presenting substantially identical facts ' the-fourth
and fifth articles of the proclamation were considered. It was held
that enemy vessels sailing from a foreign port for an enemy port
before the date of the war, with an ultimate destination to a port
of the United States for a return cargo, and captured after the date
of war while proceeding to an enemy port, are not protected under
either the fourth or fifth articles of the proclamation, nor do they
come within the reasons usually assigned for exemption from cap-
ture. The reasoning of the decision is shown in the following quo-
tations:
If that document (the proclamatioir) in its bearing on
this case could be regarded as ambiguous, a liberal con-
struction might be indulged in. * * * As applicable
here, the meaning of the language used appears to us plain
and the proclamation not open to interpretation since none
is needed. Nor are we justified in expanding executive ac-
tion by construction because of the diplomatic attitude
of this Government in respect to the exemption of all-prop-
erty not contraband of citizens and subjects of nations at
war with each other, an exemption which has not as yet
been adopted into the law of nations. * * * (The ves-
sel) had no cargo to be discharged at any port or place in
the United States, but had cargo for Santiago and Cien-
fuegos, Cuban ports held by the Spanish forces, and she
cleared not for Pensacola, but for Santiago. * * *
She was sailing from one port to another port of the enemy,
and all the cargo she had on board was destined for the
enemy's ports. * * * In these circumstances the- fact
that the Pedro was under contract to ultimately proceed,
after concluding her visit to the Spanish ports, to a port
of the United States, to there load for Europe, did not
bring her within the exemption of the proclamation.
I The Pedro, 175 U. S., 354; The Guido, id. 382.
.313
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In the case of The Panama1 it was held that a Spanish mail
steamship attached to the naval reserve of Spain under a postal con-
tract, under which she was moderately armed for defence in that
service, as well as for possible use by the Spanish government in
time of war, was not exempt from capture under the fourth article
of the proclamation, or the sixth which enjoined non-interference
with the voyages of mail steamers except for grave causes. This
clause is held to apply to neutral vessels only, and not to restrict
in any degree the authority of the United States or of their naval
officers to search and seize vessels carrying the mails between the
United States and the enemy's country. The conclusions of the
court are succinctly shown in the following paragraphs:
The mere fact, therefore, that the Panama was a mail
steamship and that she carried mail of the United States on
this voyage, does not afford any ground for exempting
her from capture. * * *
Upon full consideration of this case, this court is of
opinion that the proclamation, expressly declaring that
the exemption shall not apply to any Spanish vessel hav-
ing on board any article prohibited or contraband of war,
or a single military or naval officer, or even a dispatch, of
the enemy, cannot reasonably be construed as including in
the description of "Spanish merchant vessels" which are
to be temporarily exempt from capture, a Spanish vessel
owned by a subject of the enemy; having an armament fit
for hostile use; intended in the event of war to be used as
a war vessel; destined to a port of the enemy; and liable
on arriving there, to be taken possession of by the enemy,
and employed as an auxiliary cruiser of the enemy's navy,
in the war with this country.
In the Fishing Smack Cases' the necessary harshness of war and
the mitigations founded on ethical and humane considerations came
into sharp contrast. The argument on behalf of the Government
undertook to show that, while by express allowance of the sovereign
or executive in the past, small fishing boats of the enemy near their
own coasts were exempted on humane grounds and sometimes be-
cause they supplied subsistence to the belligerent's own vessels on
blockade duty, larger vessels of the types involved ought not to be
exempted, and were not in fact exempted under any well established
rule of international law, unless by express executive ordinance. But
the majority of the Supreme Court found, after an exhaustive re-
x 176 U. S., 535.
2 175 U. S., 677.
3-r4
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view of the authorities, especially in international law and under the
recent practice of nations, that the exemption of such vessels had
become an established rule of prize law, and, in effect, that an af-
firmative executive order would be necessary to justify capture.
The dissenting opinion expressed the view that the vessels were not
exempt as matter of law, and stated that-
The rule is that exemption from the rigors of war is
in the control of the Executive. He is bound by no im-
mutable rule on the subject. It is for him to apply, or mod-
ify, or to deny altogether such immunity as may have been
usually extended.
There yeas involved in the Benito Estenger
1 a colorable transfer
of a vessel from an enemy to a neutral, the enemy subject claiming
that he was an adherent of the Cuban insurgent cause and that the
trade in which he was engaged was not illicit. The court held the
transfer to be a mere cover to an enemy interest, reaffirmed the estab-
lished doctrine that enemy status depends upon the citizen or subject
relation without regard to individual sentiments or dispositions, and
held further that, irrespective of an established blockade and breach
thereof, property engaged in any illegal intercourse with the enemy
is deemed enemy property.
In the case of the Carlos F. Roses2 the vessel was condemned
as enemy property in the court below, and no appeal was- taken.
Neutral bankers claimed the cargo on the ground that they had
made advances upon the security of the bills of lading indorsed in_
blank, and were wholly unindemnified except through insurers who
would be subrogated to their own rights. Their claim was allowed
in the cotirt below; but the majority of the Supreme Court found
that the face of the papers and the transactions so far as they were
shown presented evidence of an enemy interest which called upon
the asserted neutral owners to prove beyond question their right
and title, which they bad not sufficiently done within the rules and
requirements established by the authorities; "that as the vessel was
an enemy vessel, the presumption was that the cargo was enemy's
property, and this could only be overcome by clear and positive evi-
dence to the contrary."
The court adverted to the fact that provisions by the modem
law of nations may become contraband although belonging to a
neutral, on account of the particular situation of the war or on ac-
I 176 U. S., 568.
2 177 U. S., 655.
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count of their destination, as for military use at ports of naval or
military equipment (see also the Benito &tenger, supra), and that in
this instance the concentration and accumulation of provisions at
Havana might be considered a necessary part of Spanish military
operations imminente bello, and these particular provisions as espe-
cially appropriate for Spanish military use.
The cases not yet decided and now before the court include those
arising out of the battles of Manila and Santiago in which the
chief question is the special statutory point whether enemy nationalT
vessels defeated in the engagements and stranded or partially sub-
merged, but afterwards raised and reconstructed, or intended to be
reconstructed, for our navy, are to be taken as prize or as vessels
"sunk or otherwise destroyed,"' which call for bounty in lieu of
prize money. 2  Another pending case comes up on the distribution,
of the proceeds of the Panama, ante, and presents the question of
relative force of the captors and the prize on which depends the
right of the Government to a moiety or of the captors to the entire
proceeds.1 A second question relates to signal distance and the
rights of "joint captors," i. e., other vessels claiming to share.4 5
The Fishing Smack Cases have also reappeared on the Govern-
ment's appeal from decree below in the further proceedings
directed by the Supreme Court on its judgment of resti-
tution, allowing damages, when the case on condemnation
was decided (ante). The present phase will determine whether the
quantum of damages decreed is excessive and whether the Govern-
ment or the naval captors individually (according to the old rule)
are responsible for the damages.
It will be perceived from this summary that the maritime cap-
tures of the Spanish war have furnished a variety of legal inquiries,
ranging widely through the entire field of prize law, general and
statutory. It is also interesting and noticeable that dissenting views
have been expressed almost invariably, and about equally whether
I sec. 4635, Rev. Stat.
2 In these cases it has just been decided that those Spanish war vessels
defeated at Manila which were afterwards raised, reconstructed and areactually now in our navy, are good prize. On the other hand, as to the Teresa,defeated and stranded at Santiago and lost on the way north after being raisedit was held that until salvage was accomplished, she was not appropriated tothe use of the United States, and therefore bounty and not prize was due.
3 sec. 463o, Rev. Stat.
4 sec. 4632, Rev. Stat.
5 This case has just been decided by the Supreme Court in favor of theappellee's claim to be the sole captor and of inferior force to the prize.
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the judgment-of the court was for condemnation or restitution. This
fact illustrates typically the conflict of judicial opinion on important
public questions not fully settled. It also particularly shows the
transition and evolution in this branch of international jurfsprudence
wherein liberal ethics, always in advance of the law of a given
time, constantly endeavor to secure firm concessions from the rules
of warfare, which are essentially strict. On a complete review it
may be said that the opinions both of the majority and minority of
the court stand for the most enlightened and humane views, and
maintain the advanced position which the United States holds.
Where checks have been interposed to claims and doctrines tending
to nullify the law as it has come down to us, the court has justly
recognized the law as it is and refused to give effect by construction
to principles which have not yet been adopted into the law of na-
tions. So long as war exists, the rule thus. indicated -must neces-
sarily guide executive policy and judicial conclusions. The process
of progress will be slow, however steady; and will be substantially
contemporaneous and mutual for all the great powers.
t may be said, in conclusion, as illustrating by a final example
the advanced attitude at all times of the United States, that by the
act of March 3, 1899, 1 prize is now only a national right, the prize




I 3o Stat., 1004.
